The Mythic Horizon of the University: Problems and Possibilities for Value-Based Leadership

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Abstract

There is presently a growing malaise in the university where more and more faculty are feeling disillusioned and increasingly disconnected from the institution. At one level the malaise is rooted in the university's financial crisis. Repeated budget cuts, downsizing, and restructuring exercises are leaving faculty tired, cynical, and fragmented. This paper examines how the dominant mythos of the university further exacerbates the malaise. It first considers why value-based leadership must focus on the myths we work by if an organization is to become truly visionary. It then suggests that the dominant utilitarian-instrumental myth contributes to the malaise by undermining the university's communal, educational, and ethical integrity. The final section proposes concrete avenues that could lead beyond the myth.

Résumé

L'université vit présentement un malaise grandissant. De plus en plus de professeurs(es) se sentent désillusionnés et en marge de leur institution. Ce malaise est en parti relié à la crise financière des universités. Les coupures budgétaires à répétition ainsi que les exercices de restructuration qui n'en finissent plus engendrent l'épuisement, le cynisme, et l'éparpillement du travail. Le texte qui suit pose un regard sur le mythe utilitaire-instrumental qui définit les valeurs de l'université et examine comment le malaise est profondément exacerbé par ce mythe. En premier lieu, le texte explique pourquoi le leadership doit porter une attention particulière aux mythes qui forment les valeurs d'une organisation aspirant à devenir vraiment visionnaire. En second lieu, le texte suggère que le mythe utilitaire-instrumental contibue au malaise en minant l'intégrité communautaire, éducationnelle et morale de l'université. La dernière section propose des pistes qui pourraient nous mener au delà du mythe.

In a recent study on leadership in organizations Kuczmarski and Kuczmarski (1995) interviewed 200 people working in a variety of small and large organizations. They found a deep malaise. Repeated mergers, budget cuts, and downsizing have left workers feeling disillusioned, betrayed, confused, and apathetic. The interviewees described how their experience of community is being replaced by a sense of isolation. According to Kuczmarski and Kuczmarski (1995) this feeling of "anomie" is leading to a form of "organizational schizophrenia," where workers are becoming "disconnected from their organizations" (p. 27).

Although this study did not focus on universities, I have the distinct impression that their findings accurately describe a growing malaise in the university. More and

more I am finding that conversations with colleagues and support staff revolve around a sense of disillusionment with the university. The tone of our conversations is increasingly pessimistic and cynical. Our mood is sullen (cf. Borgmann, 1992).

In the introduction to his book on the university, Bill Readings (1996) expresses a sentiment I am hearing more and more often. He refers to his "deep ambivalence" about the university and sees his book as an "attempt to think [his] way out of an impasse between militant radicalism and cynical despair" (p. 5). Parker Palmer, a senior associate for the American Association of Higher Education, finds that the experience of "disconnection" pervades life in the academy. Palmer regularly visits university campuses to lead workshops on teaching and learning. "I often hear," writes Palmer (1993), "about the 'pain of disconnection' among faculty, the pain of people who were once animated by a vision of 'the community of scholars' but who now find

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themselves working in a vacuum" (p. 8; cf. Palmer, 1998).[1] In a similar vein Rud (1997) refers to the "disconnection, disillusionment, and fragmentation many of us sense about our academic enterprise" (pp. 9-10).

At one level the malaise is rooted in the university's financial crisis. Dramatically reduced government funding and the ensuing budget cuts mean larger classes, fewer teaching assistants, less support staff, and less time for advising, supervision, and mentoring. Full-time positions are being replaced by shorter-term part-time contracts. This, combined with the non-replacement of retirees, leaves the remaining staff with an ever-widening circle of tasks and responsibilities. Both support and academic staff feel simultaneously overworked and unproductive. The fear of burnout is on many people's mind.

Restructuring through downsizing and departmental mergers is leaving people confused and skeptical, especially when restructuring is a never-ending story. (Our faculty is presently going through its fourth major restructuring exercise. The full-time academic staff has gone from 165 members in 1975 to the present 88. Cf. Readings, 1996, pp. 1, 195). Others feel betrayed as mergers are seen to undermine disciplinary integrity. Still others see restructuring as a conspiracy, a plot to eliminate less prestigious disciplines in favour of more marketable ones. According to Pipes (1997) and Dowbiggen (1999), paranoia arises when individuals and groups begin to lose faith in their institutions. It "thrives in the 'adversary culture' where estrangement, alienation, anger, fear, and suspicion abound" (p. 49). (As Dowbiggen acknowledges, however, even if you are paranoid it does not mean that no one is following you.) Increasingly frustrated and discouraged others are choosing to "do their own thing," metaphorically and literally "closing their office doors." Here being in community is scary, as Livsey and Palmer (1999) write, "because [we] fear getting caught in something that will add pressure to [our] lives" (p. 7). This self-imposed isolation, of course, only exacerbates the malaise. It creates a vicious circle whereby we opt out because we feel disillusioned, and we feel ever more disillusioned because we are isolated.

Some observers believe these problems will be solved once adequate funding resumes. (As I write these lines both the federal and provincial governments have announced that they are planning to increase university funding.) For example, Alain Dubuc (2000), the chief editorialist of *La Presse*, criticizes the Quebec government's most recent policy document on the University for avoiding the issue of finance. This is a grave omission, writes Dubuc, "when we know that the crisis in universities is first and foremost a financial crisis" (my translation) (p. B2). This position, I believe, is seriously

mistaken. Increased funding will certainly make an enormous difference; however, it is not the magic bullet that will suddenly make the crisis go away.

The malaise runs much deeper. Like the more generalized malaise of organizational life described in the Kuczmarski study, it reflects what Taylor (1991) refers to as the "malaise of modernity." The university, as we know it today, is a modern institution (Readings, 1996, p. 6). Its ailments, therefore, have more to do with the vision and values of modernity than deficits and budget cuts. They are rooted in the "mythic horizon" of the modern university. And since leadership is fundamentally about visions and values, the crisis raises several problems and possibilities for leadership. An exclusive focus on financial issues risks becoming a veritable Trojan horse, diverting our attention away from the deeper leadership problems and possibilities dwelling beneath the surface.[2]

The first section of this paper discusses why value-based leadership must focus on the myths we work by. This is critical if the university is to become truly visionary. Leadership takes form when we begin to develop an awareness of the myths we work by and when we begin asking whether or not those myths serve the organization. The third and fourth sections suggest that the dominant utilitarian-instrumental myth further exacerbates the malaise, and therefore serves the university poorly by undermining its educational, communal, and ethical integrity. But first, the second section examines the roots and pervasiveness of the myth in the wider culture. This section will help bring the leadership problems and possibilities into sharper focus. The final section proposes concrete avenues beyond the myth.

From a personal perspective, I see this paper as a way of refusing to acquiesce to the disillusionment described above. The paper is not a diatribe against the university. Rather, it is my way of trying to think through the malaise. It is an opportunity to place the leadership challenges on the table for further reflection and discussion. As such, the paper represents a hope-filled first step beyond isolation and toward community.

On the Importance of Attending to the Myths We Work By

By "myth" I do not mean the popular usage of myth as lie, falsehood, or illusion. Nor am I referring to those ancient tales and legends of heroes, gods, and goddesses found, for example, in Greek or Roman mythology, what Grant (1998) refers to as scholarly myths. Rather, I am referring to myth as mythos, metastory, worldview, or paradigm. Here "myth refers to an intricate set of interlocking stories, rituals, rites and customs that inform and

give the pivotal sense of meaning and direction to a person, family, community, or culture" (Keen & Valley-Fox, 1989, p. xi). It provides "a sense of personal identity, a sense of community life, a basis for moral conduct, explanations of that which cannot be known" (Postman, 1995, p. 5).

In his book on the roles of the value-driven leader, Wells (1997) begins with the basic premise that it is values that drive behaviour. "Any behavior, no matter how trivial, will have some value that drives it; everything we do has a value at its base.... If we do not like the results, we try to change behavior. An effective manager, however, causes behavior to change by working with *values*" (p. 22).

My basic premise is that we cannot change the values unless we change the myth that informs the values. If myth is the context "that underlies and informs the structures and values of societies" (Highwater, 1990, p. 7), then it is the mythos that drives the ethos. It is the myth we live by that determines whether or not a particular value is worth upholding, an action is worth rewarding, an achievement is worth celebrating, or a particular story is worth telling. The ethical principles and values we adhere to appear reasonable only because, as Kilpatrick (1992) writes, "they are embedded within a vision or worldview we hold to be true" (p. 134).

Put differently, the "small" stories we tell are considered meaningful and worthy of telling because they convey the values of the "larger" story. An organization, for example, whose larger story is the utilitarian-instrumental myth discussed below, is predisposed to tell stories revolving around the values of efficiency, productivity, and competitiveness. Here there is no greater hero than the leader who succeeds in transforming a deficit situation into a financial success. One is less inclined to tell stories of leaders who revive the spirit of an organization by infusing the workplace with a sense of joy, festivity, and community, unless, of course, these changes clearly result in greater productivity. If the small stories help us organize information in meaningful ways, the larger stories give us a framework to make sense of the smaller stories (Keen, 1993).

Both myth and vision share common features. Collins' (1999) description of the "three basic elements" of vision also applies to myth. These elements are "an organization's fundamental reason for existence...; its timeless, unchanging core values; and huge and audacious—but ultimately achievable—aspirations for its own future" (pp. 237-238). Senge (1990) calls the combination of these elements the "purpose story" of an organization—the larger "pattern of becoming that gives unique meaning to [a leader's] personal aspirations and his hopes for their organization" (p. 345). Visions and purpose stories, like myths, provide more than mere

motivation. A reason for one's existence runs much deeper. Whereas a motivation "refers to a temporary psychic event in which curiosity is aroused and attention is focused" (Postman, 1995, p. 4), a reason provides a metaphysical or spiritual foundation for our life and work (cf. Senge, 1999, p. 62). Knowing why we are here makes our life and work both reasonable and meaningful. It builds community and provides the inspiration we need to commit ourselves to the organization's core values, objectives, and activities. Writing on education, Postman (1995) is convinced that there is no better "way to bring an end to schooling than for it to have no end" (p. 4).

Myth, however, contains an additional element. Unlike deliberately constructed visions, the myths we live and work by often remain unseen, residing incognito in our daily rituals, rites, customs, and metaphors. Like an iceberg, they can be elusive, only partially visible (Keen & Valley-Fox, 1989). The mythos of an organization is akin to a school's "hidden curriculum." An official vision and a myth, therefore, can be moving in two opposite directions.

According to Moore (1972), myths tend to go through three stages. In the first stage the myth is emerging and compelling only for some people. In the second stage it becomes so established that that those embedded in its horizon simply take it for granted. In this stage, as Grant (1998) puts it, the myth "define[s] reality for us." It becomes the "perspectives we look through, rather than at" (p. 13). Here debate is anathema. Criticism is blasphemy. A myth reaches the third stage when its proponents begin to raise critical questions.

In this understanding of myth the leadership challenge is more complex than writing vision statements. To become, as Collins (1999) so aptly puts it, "a truly visionary organization" instead of merely "an organization with a vision statement" (p. 238), we must become conscious of the myths we live and work by. An organization, like an individual, that is not conscious of the myth(s) informing its values and practices is in danger of being dominated by that myth (Keen, 1993). The guiding myth becomes hegemonic, with plenty of followers but very few leaders. The movement from followership to leadership takes form when we begin to examine whether the myths we live and work by serve us well (Postman, 1995), whether they need to be revised (Keen & Valley-Fox, 1989), or whether they should be abandoned altogether. A myth that serves us poorly is, as Postman (1995) writes, a "false god" (pp. 11-18).

In *Unequal Freedoms* philosopher John McMurtry (1998) argues that a false god, what he refers to as a "pathogenic value program," works like a carcinogenic invasion. At the cellular level cancerous cells represent themselves "to the surrounding cell community as sound

and normal." "A body becomes diseased when it does not recognize this fateful distinction between life-representation and life itself." Unable to "recognize this difference" it "does not respond to the element that invades it." "The pathogenic pattern eventually takes over one organ after another and cumulatively impedes, and destroys the vital capacities of the life-host." The organism "is no longer able to function as a mutually productive whole" and "the system eventually collapses." The body's failure "to recognize and respond" is the critical element of the crisis. It is the condition that makes the invasion, and the eventual collapse, possible (pp. 35-36).

Seen from this perspective, visionary and transformational leadership is about recognizing and responding to those false gods which block, deplete, and invade the organization's "vital life functions." A coherent vision statement is of little value if a pathogenic value program blocks its realization; if the organizational culture is diseased.

In the third and fourth sections I show how the analogy of the pathogenic invasion applies to the utilitarian-instrumental myth that presently dominates the university. Since this myth has not arisen in a vacuum, however, the following section examines the roots and pervasiveness of the utilitarian-instrumental myth in the wider culture.

The Origin and Pervasiveness of the Utilitarian-Instrumental Myth in the Wider Culture

In her classic study of modernity Hannah Arendt (1958) explains that the elimination of contemplation in favour of "making" and "doing" "from the range of meaningful human capacities" (p. 305) is "perhaps the most momentous of the spiritual consequences of the discoveries of the modern age" (p. 289). Prior to the modern age, as far back as Plato and Aristotle, contemplation and being were given primacy over making and doing. Truth was seen as something given and revealed in the stillness and receptivity of contemplation. In modern times, with the rise of science, industrialization, and technology, knowledge and truth are seen in much more pragmatic terms. Humans can only know what they themselves make. The modern person is *Homo Faber*, a maker and fabricator. I am what I make and do. In the following passage Arendt summarizes the main attitudes of *Homo Faber*:

> ... his instrumentalization of the world, his confidence in tools and in the productivity of the maker of artificial objects; his trust in all the comprehensive range of the means-end category, his conviction that every issue can be solved and every human motivation reduced to the principle of utility; his sovereign-

ty, which regards everything given as material and thinks of the whole of nature as an immense fabric from which we can cut out whatever we want and resew it however we like; his equation of intelligence with ingenuity, that is, his contempt for all thought which cannot be considered to be "the first step ..."; finally his matter of course identification of fabrication with action (pp. 305-306).

A utilitarian-instrumental view of the world sees everything, whether it be objects, relationships, structures, or organizations in terms of their use-value. Something is good if it has a clearly defined function, if it can serve as an effective instrument. It has little tolerance for objects or activities having a purely spiritual or aesthetic value. Instrumental reason rules the day. As Taylor (1991) explains, instrumental reason is "the kind of rationality we draw on when we calculate the most economical application of means to a given end. Maximum efficiency, the best cost-output ratio is its measure of success" (p. 5). It represents "the triumph of procedure over substance" (Borgmann, 1992, p. 24). The primacy of instrumental reason, as Arendt describes above, is more than just an idea. It is so pervasive, and still largely taken for granted, that is has the status of myth. Taylor (1991) puts this well when he refers to "the galloping hegemony of instrumental reason" (p. 112).

Evidence of its pervasiveness is everywhere. Taylor (1991) provides the following examples: "the ways the demands of economic growth are used to justify very unequal distribution of wealth and income, or the way these same demands make us insensitive to the needs of the environment, or even to the point of potential disaster ... the way much of our social planning ... is dominated by forms of cost-benefit analysis that involve grotesque calculations, putting dollar assessments on human lives" (pp. 5-6). Instrumental rationality has had a particularly pernicious effect on the environment. *Homo Faber*, as Keen (1969) unambiguously puts it, "has become a 'waste-maker,' the anus of the machine rather than its brain" (p. 125).

The triumph of instrumental reason is particularly apparent in architecture. Modern architecture and urban planning provide the most visible expressions of the triumph of form and procedure over substance. According to Jonathan Hale (1994), the industrial, technological, and commercial revolutions in America, coupled with urbanization, completely transformed the perception of architecture's role in designing buildings. In the past, the structure of a building was seen as a composition expressing beauty. Now the structure is seen solely as something that supports the building. The functional replaces the aesthetic. Practicality takes precedence over qualities and values such as developing a sense of place, aliveness, harmony, and community.

Hale finds that the architects he meets in various conferences and work sites around the world are increasing discouraged and disillusioned by this instrumentalization of their work. They would agree with Borgmann (1992) who observes that the triumph of instrumental reason in urban planning has "deeply wounded and disfigured our cities" (p. 59). Public communal and democratic spaces, places where people meet, play, walk, talk, and celebrate, are cleared to make room for high rise buildings, shopping malls, and more efficient highways. Human habitats, places where people actually live and feel alive, are replaced by sites for more efficient consumption (McKibben, 1995, p. 103). Here the passenger car becomes the "vehicle of modernism" designed to get us in the city as quickly as possibly, work, consume, and then leave as quickly as we came. Elevated horizontal highways make our travelling more efficient while simultaneously sparing us the burden of useless encounters and the unseemly sight of poverty and decay (Borgmann, 1992, pp. 57-60, 130-138).

In modern medicine instrumental reason is evident in what Frank (1995) refers to as the "restitution narrative." Its plot goes as follows: "Yesterday I was healthy, today I'm sick, but tomorrow I'll be healthy again" (p. 77). Here the body is a machine. Illness indicates that the machine is broken. The role of the physician is to fix the machine using the most sophisticated procedures and technological instruments modern medicine can provide. "For every suffering there is a remedy" (p. 80). Decline and death are unacknowledged possibilities because they threaten *Homo Faber*'s claim to potency, control, and invulnerability.

Not surprising then that a physician like David Hilfiker (1994), who practices "poverty medicine" among the homeless, can be accused of wasting his professional education (p. 213). How can he commit his life to a form of medicine with such an "abysmal" success rate? In this version of instrumental reason the tools, the procedure, and the cure are more important than the physician-patient relationship.

As was seen above, the ethical principles and values we adhere to and live our lives by appear reasonable because they are embedded in a mythos or metastory we hold to be true. Hilfiker's critic believes poverty medicine is a waste of one's education because his view of the world is informed by a utilitarian-instrumental logic. Here Hilfiker's work is truly unreasonable. In Hilfiker's view of the world, however, poverty medicine is reasonable and valuable because "honoring the pain, recognizing the fear and holding on to hope" (Hilfiker, 1994, p. 229) are more important than fixing the broken part. He would agree with Palmer (1990) who observes that works of vision and substance, such as "loving other people, opposing injustice, comforting the grieving,

bringing an end to war" should not be evaluated by their effectiveness but rather by the "commitment to work away at them" (p. 75).

The Utilitarian-Instrumental Myth in Education: From Pre-School to the University

Instrumental reason is deeply pervasive at all levels of education. Many people, from parents to curriculum designers and politicians, see the school in purely functional terms, as a means to an end. The school is the place where one teaches the knowledge, skills, and specialized competencies required to find a good job and be successful (Balthazar & Blanger, 1989; Giroux, 1998). A utilitarian education has its own version of salvation. It promises parents and students that if "you pay attention in school, and do your homework, and score well on tests, and behave yourself, you will be rewarded with a well-paying job when you are done" (Postman, 1995, p. 27). Modern inventions such as the "pre-natal university," where stimulation of infants begins in the womb, hope to give children "one leg up on the competition" (Elkind, 1988, p. xv). In "Knowledge Adventure's Jump Start Baby Program" nine-month-old babies can consolidate their competitive advantage by developing "a comfort level with computers" (Stoll, 1999, p. 61). Here education and productivity are inseparable. Learning, and the students themselves, are products to be homogenized and standardized (Caouette, 1992). As in modern architecture, there is little tolerance for subjects or activities that celebrate aesthetic, moral, or spiritual values, unless we show how these have use-value (Gagnon, 1995). The arts in education, for example, gain widespread acceptance if people believe that aesthetic values or artistic qualities enhance functional competencies (Phillips, 1993). Ritzer (1996) would refer to this state of affairs as yet another example of the "McDonaldization of society."

At the university level, instrumental reason pervades teacher education programs. As Hare (1993) writes, "the dominant tendency has been to reduce teaching to a set of trainable skills and measurable competencies" (p. iii; cf. Hlebowitsh, 1990; Tom, 1984). The widespread usage of the phrase "teacher training" suggests that teacher education is seen primarily as the acquisition of information and skills relevant to one's trade. Student teaching is the place where one learns to apply the tools of the trade. As technicians and functionaries teachers are not expected to think but rather deliver "teacher-proof" curricula authored by external authorities. John Dewey referred to this process as the fabrication of the "machine teacher" trained for the "blind observance of rule and routine" (cited in Hare, 1993, p. iv).

Teacher education represents only the tip of the iceberg. Instrumental reason is deeply entrenched in the university writ large. As in the example of architecture, the industrial, technological, and commercial revolutions of modernity have completely transformed how the university sees itself. Bill Readings' description of how this gets played out in the university is particularly helpful. According to Readings (1996), the modern university is presently dominated by the "techno-bureaucratic notion of excellence." Here the administrator and not the professor is "the central figure of the university" (p. 3). Like a "national airline carrier," the university has become a "transnational bureaucratic corporation" (p. 14). Having no content it is neither political nor ethical. The role of leaders is to enable or inspire the pursuit of excellence in teaching, research, administration, and even parking (p. 24). Here excellence is defined technocratically as efficiency and not ethically as virtue or goodness.

Although the University of Excellence is not value-free (efficiency is a value), it is referential-free. It does not matter what we teach, research, or write. What matters, and from a mythic perspective this is a matter of ultimate concern, is that we teach, research, and write "excellently." Accountability is determined by quantifiable, and therefore measurable, "performance indicators": the number and size of grants, the number of publications, awards, times cited in academic publications, students graduated, how long it takes students to graduate, etc.

In this mythos the university is a business competing in the global marketplace. The job of the university is to deliver a quality product. As Readings (1996) observes, comparative university ratings, such as the *Maclean's* report, are used to determine which universities offer the best value for the money. Teaching is not a matter of truth or justice but something delivered to student/consumers. Student evaluations, with their five-point scales, serve as indexes of consumer satisfaction (p. 19; cf. Fisher, 2000).

Computers and computer-based learning play a vital role in a utilitarian education. The prestige surrounding technology in general, and information technology in particular, has us convinced that we should seek technological solutions to all our problems (Taylor, 1991, p. 6). And, like the growing commercialization of the university, this commitment to information technology consolidates even further the pervasiveness of instrumental reason (Fisher, 2000). As was seen above, computers are perceived as a way of getting a head start in a competitive market. There is presently no better way to successfully market a school than convince parents the school is equipped with the latest computers and is connected to the World Wide Web (Noble, 1996). In the University of Excellence, where more and faster are ends in them-

selves, the promise of greater speed and efficiency is particularly alluring. This may explain why there always seems to be money for computers and computer-based teaching innovations, even in a time of deficits and budget cuts (Stoll, 1999). It may also explain why the Quebec government is willing to spend millions of dollars connecting families to the Internet at a time when there is not enough money for health care and when countless inner city children are going to school hungry (Berger, 2000; Le Cours, 2000). (Or might it be that government leaders see this as another way of consolidating Quebec's competitive advantage in a market economy? Or could it be that government leaders see families as untapped markets for e-commerce?)

In my university the phrase "teaching innovation" has become synonymous with computer applications involving such things as presentation software, list serves, and web-based courses. If the instrumental logic of excellence is pushed to its limit the next step may well be the complete automation of teaching, liberating professors from the burden of in-class teaching and giving them unlimited time for research and publication. In the public schools, writes Noble (1996), "the image of the child at the computer came to symbolize intense intellectual activity akin to that depicted in Rodin's famous statue" (p. 18). In the university, the "Automated Professor Machine"(CAUT, 1999), like Charlie Chaplin's "Automatic Feeding Device" in the film *Modern Times* (Hochschild, 1997, p. 224), may come to symbolize the meaning of excellence.

Seen in this light the fear that marketable disciplines will replace less prestigious ones cannot be dismissed as paranoia. As was seen above, the arts in education are constantly struggling for their survival. Advocates are usually successful when they show convincingly how their particular art form has use-value. In my faculty advocates have not been successful in this regard. The department of Arts in Education no longer exists and elementary education students are not required to take any courses in this area. The next step may be the elimination of values education and philosophy of education. As McMurtry (1991) notes, humanities departments, and particularly departments of philosophy, have already "been particularly hard hit" (p. 216).

Why the Myth Needs to Be Rewritten

It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine all the reasons why the myth is problematic. Several reasons are stated and implied in the above discussion. In this section I focus briefly on the critical issue of integrity. The utilitarian-instrumental myth needs to be rewritten

because it undermines the university's ethical, communal, and educational integrity.

On the issue of educational integrity, McMurtry's (1991) analysis of the market model is especially helpful. This submission of education to market rules, McMurtry argues, undermines the integrity of education because the market economy and educational sites operate with opposing goals, motivations, methods, and standards of excellence. For example, whereas the goal of the marketplace is to maximize profit, the goal of educational institutions is to advance and share knowledge. Whereas the "motivation of the market is to satisfy the wants of whoever has the money to purchase" those wants, "the motivation of education is to develop sound understanding whether it is wanted or not." "What is the best policy for buying a product—to assert the customer's claim as 'always right'—is the worst possible policy for a learner. What is the best policy for selling a product—to offend no-one and no vested interest—may be the worst possible policy for an educator" (p. 214; cf. Pring, 1996).

Good teachers know that students need to be both affirmed and challenged. A good education can sometimes be unsettling. This is why teaching awards, particularly those based on student votes and student evaluation alone, can be one of the worst things for teachers and students. A teacher in search of votes must remain popular, and to remain popular one is less likely to challenge students.

The same problem arises with student fellowships based solely on CGPA (cumulative grade point average) counts. Over and over again I see the story unfolding as follows. A student earns a fellowship after an extremely successful academic year. Paradoxically, the student gets straight A's but is never really preoccupied with grades. S/He takes courses to learn. There is, however, a condition attached to the fellowship. It will only be renewed if the student continues to get A's in all courses. It doesn't take long before the student starts selecting courses on the basis of whether or not s/he is guaranteed an A— even if s/he knows the course will be a good learning experience. The student sacrifices the integrity of his or her education for a prize. The fellowship turns out to be a poisoned gift.

The accounting logic of the university also undermines the ethical integrity of its evaluation process, which as the word e-valu-ation suggests, may be one of the most important loci of value questions in educational institutions. Although public accountability is important, as Readings (1996) argues, it does not follow that accountability follows "a logic of accounting." Evaluation is a social-ethical issue and not just a measurement device (pp. 19-43).

To illustrate just how ethically vacuous this notion is

I've tried to imagine how it might work in criminal law. Here killing another person would be condoned, and perhaps even celebrated, if it was done efficiently. The question for the jury would not be whether the killing was justified, as in the case of self-defense, but whether it was well-planned and executed, left no trace, and did incur unnecessary suffering. Although this may seem unimaginable and far-fetched, it is precisely where the U.S. debate over capital punishment has moved (Prejean, 1994, pp. 212-222). The debate is no longer over issues of justice—for example, whether executions are racially biased—but rather how to kill efficiently, without pain, and without having the body fall apart during the execution.

Moreover, the more efficient the executions become, the more the concern for justice fades in the background. Texas, the state with the greatest number of executions, is seen to have the most efficient "judicial machinery." To speed up the execution process the judge, and not the state governor, signs the execution order. The condemned have no right to a hearing, and the state's 18 "grace commissioners" never meet. They vote by fax (Temman, 2000).

Although it may be unfair to compare efficient executions with excellence in the university, it is fair to say that they both follow the same logic. In both cases form is more important than the content, and in both cases the paradigmatic or mythic commitment to efficiency is more important, and may even undermine, the commitment to ethical principles and due process. In other words, the moral of this story is that there is no moral.

Pushing the capital punishment analogy one step further I would say that the Tenure Track is the university's version of death row. Waiting for the outcome of the evaluation process can feel like an eternity, and success depends, to a large extent, on how effectively you present yourself. Moreover, an arbitrary quantitative judgement can literally mean that you lose your professional life. Judgments can read as follows. "We are too top heavy on tenured staff" (Snyder, 1997). "She doesn't have enough publications." "His grants are too small." "His evaluation scores are too low." At best, applying the logic of accounting to tenure decisions transforms academics into agents of self-promotion. Your future depends on the extent to which you can turn yourself into a marketable product, worthy of a place on the university's own walk of stars.

The reduction of excellence to measurable outcomes also undermines the communal integrity of university life. Defining excellence as hyperproductivity leads to hyperactivity. And hyperactivity is not conducive to community building. It makes us impatient, as Hannah Arendt noted above, with everything that is not "the first step..." (pp. 305-306). Hence we favour the

bureaucratic model of department and faculty meetings. In the following quote Ristau and Ryan (1996) describe well the cost of limiting all our interactions to business meetings. Although they are not referring specifically to the university, what they describe fully resonates with my experience.

> Community work, people actually working together, has been replaced by meetings. Meeting time is often spent trying to move through agendas with too many items for the time allotted; busy people arrive late and leave early. What gets sacrificed is any time to talk, discuss, consider options, or enjoy each other's company. People report on what they have done and quickly vote on what to do next. The relentless calendar of activities keeps moving on, but people's relationships with one another remain superficial (p. 15).

In the mad rush to become a star we must sacrifice all those little things that, taken together, are vital to our sense of community—taking the time to engage conversations for the sheer joy of it; honouring a student's (or colleague's) pain by simply listening when he or she is in crisis; recognizing the fear of a student who is terrorized by the prospect of leaving school and entering his or her profession; or offering guidance to the student (or colleague) who seeks it.

As Borgmann (1992) notes, cultural hyperactivity works like its clinical counterpart. One "suffers from a greatly shortened attention span," "exhibits an extremely narrowed focus on the world" and is intolerant vis-à-vis "more placid humans" (p. 13). The cost of hyperactivity is the inability to be fully present to each other and to our work. It leads to impatience "with difficulty and depth of meaning" (p. 15). An equally significant issue is the toll hyperactivity takes on health and families (Hochschild, 1997).

Leadership Challenges (and Strategies) Arising

The growing disillusionment with the university is partly rooted in overwork and restructuring fatigue. This, however, does not tell the whole story. Living and working in an inane culture further exacerbates the disillusionment. Valuing hyperproductivity over substance and depth, accenting hyperactivity over careful presence and patient thoughtfulness, reducing education to use-values and market motives, and using efficiency as the standard of value and success, may well lead, to use Palmer's (1990) words, to "defeat and despair." It may be the surest "path to either inanity or insanity" (p. 76).

Efficiency is important, as Taylor (1991) argues, if we "are going to survive." Institutions "have to be managed to some degree according to the principles of

bureaucratic rationality if they are to be managed at all" (p. 97). Serious problems arise, however, when instrumental reason dominates the institution's modus operandi and modus vivendi. Can a mythos that reduces the value and success of academic work to the single dimension of measurable outcomes have sufficient depth and breath to really inspire? How long can universities expect faculty to "risk their very substance," as Borgmann (1992) puts it, to fulfill "the one-dimensional and trite character of score-keeping" (p. 15).

Where do we go from here? What are the leadership challenges arising? Can leadership, to use Taylor's (1991) phrase, "roll back the galloping hegemony of instrumental reason" (p. 112)? In this final section of the paper I place six possibilities on the table.

The first challenge is to choose our leaders carefully. In an eight-year study of the downfall of a major corporation, Pitcher (1995) found the root of the problem to be a crisis in leadership. The downfall began when the visionary founder of the organization passed the torch to a technocrat who then filled all the key leadership positions with other technocrats. Artists (people-oriented, imaginative, open-minded, intuitive, inspiring, funny, visionary) and craftsmen (humane, dedicated, knowledgeable, trustworthy, stable, wise) were systematically replaced until the corporation was entirely dominated by technocrats (cerebral, uncompromising, intense, determined, meticulous, methodical). Although the artists and craftsmen worked well with each other and with technocrats, technocrats had no tolerance for the other two.

Pitcher's (1995) findings illustrate well how the hegemony of instrumental reason undermines the integrity of an organization. To use McMurtry's (1998) analogy of the carcinogenic invasion (presented earlier), we might say that the visionary founder of the organization was unable to recognize the cancerous cells. He never imagined that the ensuing pathogenic invasion would systematically and efficiently take over one vital organ after another and "cumulatively impede and destroy" the vital capacities of the organization. No longer able to function with integrity, as "a mutually productive whole," the system eventually collapsed (Pitcher, p. 36).

A second challenge, made necessary by the first, is to establish a centre (literally or metaphorically) for the university's study of itself. Centres are presently all the rage in universities. The mission of this centre would be to erect a watchtower (as opposed to an ivory tower) on the look-out for possible pathogenic invasions and Trojan horses. It would look inward, exerting a centripetal force on the university to counterbalance the dominant centrifugal forces (cf. Freitag, 1998, p. 76). The centre should include people who have a sense of the university's history. Its members should be richly diversified, from both the arts and sciences. It could also benefit

from someone who is slightly paranoid. His or her natural suspiciousness could be used to make the tower's central alarm system. The qualification that this member be only slightly paranoid, however, is important. A succession of false alarms is likely to drain the centre's vital energy (Lelord & André, 1999). The centre would need people capable of raising critical value questions. To this end the centre will need at least one resident oncologist, someone who recognizes a cancer cell when it appears (cf. Rud, 1997).

A third challenge is to invite faculty out of their isolation and give them permission to speak their minds and hearts. As Palmer (1998) emphasizes, however, the conversation must be a free choice. "In the privatized academy," leaders "who try to coerce conversation will fail" (p. 156). Palmer proposes "good talk about good teaching" (pp. 141-161) as an important topic for the conversation. In the university we rarely, if ever, have the opportunity to talk to each other about our teaching (cf. Wisely & Lynn, 1994). We attend teaching workshops but rarely attend to a valuable resource right in our midst—each other. Good talk with our colleagues about good teaching could represent a meaningful alternative to the demoralizing surrender of "this complex craft to ten or fifteen dimensions, measured on a five-point scale" (Palmer, 1998, p. 142).

I propose that we extend the conversation to good talk about good teaching and research, and about the relationship between the two. This could be one way of addressing the fragmentation arising from hyperactivity. We rarely have opportunities to talk and reflect on the possible links between the two. Academics who value research above all often see teaching as a burden. Academics who value teaching above research often see the time required for good research as something that pulls them away from good teaching. It is not enough to say, as is presently the case, that we will not have anything to teach unless we do research. That argument flies in the face of common sense and experience. Students everywhere encounter great teachers who are not researchers. A professor who lives, breathes, converses, reads widely, and thinks can be an excellent teacher.

If, however, I discovered that I could become a better teacher through research and writing, and a better researcher and writer through my teaching, then the idea that we are teacher-researchers begins to make sense. This could also be a way beyond the narcissistic attitude that I am too great a teacher (or researcher) to be wasting my time doing research (or teaching). A good starting point for this conversation could be the proceedings of a recent conference sponsored by the Quebec Federation of University Teachers. One workshop focused precisely on the possible links between teaching and research (Laramée, 1999; cf. Piette, 1999).

A fourth challenge is to create opportunities for reflection, dialogue, and debate on the advantages and disadvantages of information technology. As Taylor (1991) observes, "the institutions of a technological society don't ineluctably impose on us an ever-deepening hegemony of instrumental reason. But it is clear that left to themselves they have a tendency to push in that direction" (p. 109). If anthropologists from another planet were to study faculties of education they would conclude that the blessings of information technology for education are universally accepted. They would not know that there is presently a vast body of critical literature. If they did they might discover that these critics are not just neo-Luddites and reactionaries. Many speak from a long experience working with computers. Many actually use and like computers (Gutstein, 1999; Stoll, 1999).

University faculties of education can exercise leadership in this area by helping schools, and other educational sites, make enlightened decisions. It is not enough to train teachers how to use computers. Schools, and society more generally, need a university where we live, cultivate, and develop the spirit of understanding, insight, and judgment (Freitag, 1998).[3]

As a way beyond a purely technocratic response to the challenges raised by information technology, I suggest that educational leaders begin with the most basic epistemological question: How do we know? How do we know that computers are good for schools? How do we know that computers in education create more good than harm? How do we know that computers in education are really educational and not a form of "edutainment" (Gutstein, 1999)? How does technology change the way we see the world (Burbules, 1996)? How does it change our relationship to reality (Borgmann, 1999)? Is it value-neutral? Does it predispose us to prefer certain values over others (Postman, 1993)? To what extent is the argument for information technology solidly educational and to what extent is it sheer "market madness;" an attempt by the computer and software industries to colonize new markets (Gutstein, 1999; Noble, 1996)? If technology proposes a particular conception of the good life, should we, as Blacker (1996) asks, "avoid teaching technology in public schools in the same way we avoid teaching a particular religious doctrine" (p. 14)?

A fifth challenge is to pay special attention to the physical space we work in. As was seen above, modern architecture and urban planning have undermined the communal integrity of our cities. Physical spaces reflect and reinforce who are and what values we wish to promote. Even a prisoner knows that the first thing he must do upon entering his new cell is to personalize the space with meaningful objects and mementos (Cooper-Marcus, 1995).

The university building I work in is thoroughly modern. It aptly symbolizes "higher education," extending vertically toward the sky. The few windows we have cannot be opened. Most classes are in windowless inner rooms. Each department is on a separate floor. The cafeteria is in the basement. Like the modern super highway, we can enter the building from the parking garage, take the elevator to our floor, close the office door, do our work, and leave at the end of the day without ever interacting with colleagues or students. Although this very efficient structure may serve my productivity well, it offers little in the way of community and hospitality.

Ideally, university leaders should participate in the design of new buildings and in major renovation projects with a view to structurally incorporate nonutilitarian values. With an already existing building the challenge is to personalize and humanize the existing spaces and to preserve those spaces that enhance community. (The lounge in my faculty, one of the few windowed and relatively comfortable public spaces, has been transformed into a room for formal meetings.)

A sixth challenge or strategy is to draw upon the richness and depth of good storytelling. As a teacher I have always been fascinated by the power of a good story. Simple words like "have I told you the story about..." often trigger a fever of excitement and expectation. It is wonderful to see how a good story infuses life back into lifeless expressions, how a good storyteller calls upon "the wind that blows soul into the faces of listeners" (Estes, 1995, p. 20). Equally compelling is the story's capacity "to present the knife of insight" (p. 21), to express a depth of insight not easily communicated through formal arguments. Lopez (1988) puts this well when he writes that truth or insight cannot "be reduced to aphorism or formula. It is something alive and unpronounceable. Story creates an atmosphere in which (truth) becomes discernable as pattern" (p. 69). The ability to recognize meaningful patterns is particularly important in an age when we are literally bombarded and overwhelmed with information (Borgmann, 1999; Postman, 1989).

In ethics and moral education several authors argue that nothing else seems to have the same power to fully articulate the richness, complexity, depth, and ambiguity of moral experience (Hauerwas, 1977; MacIntyre, 1984; Maguire, 1978; Johnson, 1993). Because stories are consistent with the narrative structure of our experience, narrative in moral education provides opportunities for "deepened understanding of ourselves and others, and for bridging morally diverse communities" (Witherell, 1991, p. 239; cf. Coles, 1986; Fulford, 1999; Morris, 1994; Tappan & Brown, 1991). In his study of the moral imagination, philosopher Mark Johnson (1993) sees narrative as contributing to the development "of our moral sensitivity, our ability to make subtle discriminations, and our empathy for others." Unlike a formal argument, it allows us to go "out toward people to inhabit their world, not just by rational calculation, but also in imagination, feeling and expression" (p. 200).

In his latest book, *Intelligence Reframed*, psychologist Howard Gardner (1999) argues that effective leaders, those "who succeed in making changes without coercion," are necessarily good storytellers. Compelling narratives, writes Gardner, rally people toward a common cause (p. 126). Similarly, in *Encouraging the Heart*, Kouzes and Posner (1999) argue that storytelling is one of the seven essentials of good leadership. It is one of the most powerful ways "to convey the values and ideals shared by a community" (p. 24). Although they entertain, good stories can do much more. They effectively illustrate a point and provide a stock of good examples. They can move, touch, and inspire. Contextual in nature, they allow us to remember more fully. In their book on leadership in schools, Bolman and Deal (1994) conclude that stories "provide a starting point for updating, reinvigorating, and reframing the school's identity and culture" (p. 81). Wisely and Lynn (1994) suggest that storytelling gives leaders a way to create a space for dialogue. Paradoxically, the telling of personal stories "becomes a pathway to the communal" (p. 107). Not surprising then that Weil refers to storytelling as nothing less than "the ultimate leadership tool" (cited in Kouzes & Posner, 1999, p. 99).

Good storytelling is like taking bits and pieces of seemingly disparate elements and weaving them together to form a resplendent quilt. What was once a meaningless collection of material comes to life in a beautifully textured pattern with myriad colours and shapes. The gift of a quilt, like the gift of storytelling, is greater than the sum of its parts (Estes, 1993). It connects the giver and receiver in a particular time and place. This is why, for example, no other object connects me to my grandmother more deeply than a quilt she made for me in the last years of her life. Witherell (1991) says this nicely when she writes that the "story fabric" attaches "us to others, to our history, and to ourselves by providing a tapestry rich with threads of time, place, character, and even advice..." (p. 239). (For a perceptive metaphorical exploration of these ideas see Whitney Otto's 1994 novel *How to Make an American Quilt*.)

A story from my own experience illustrates how this form of storytelling can play an important role in university leadership. I have never felt a sense of community in the university more profoundly than the evening the chair of my doctoral committee, William Lawlor, gave me the gift of a story-quilt. Dr. Lawlor organized a festive dinner to celebrate the completion of my doctoral studies. He invited about 30 people, mostly graduate

students, academic and support staff, and members of the oral defense committee. To launch the evening Dr. Lawlor told the story of how I came to the university and how our collaboration evolved steadily over the years. To my amazement he was able to weave a thread that connected everyone present in some meaningful way. He told a small anecdotal story about everyone in the room and each story was in some way linked to the larger story that brought us together that evening. The story-quilt was a testimony to a form of leadership that is all too rare in the university (Smith, 1990). One external member of the committee, a seasoned veteran of countless defenses, continued to speak fondly and longingly about the experience several years later. He described it as his most significant experience of hospitality in a university context.

To say that Dr. Lawlor used an effective leadership tool, however, would trivialize both the story and the storyteller. At its best storytelling is not a mere instrument or the first step toward some objective. It is a freely given gift, an end in itself, a way of being in community. Using storytelling as technique is ultimately self-defeating. It feels inauthentic. Genuine storytellers give the impression that their stories "grow out of their lives as roots grow a tree" (Estes, 1995, p. 509).

There are, therefore, several good reasons why storytelling should be placed at the centre of leadership in general and value-based educational leadership in particular. Authentic storytelling has the power to bridge differences, stimulate the moral imagination, craft an identity, revive the spirit, and resist the momentum of disconnection. Storytelling, however, will have a limited impact unless the underlying mythos of the university supports the visions and values a given story is attempting to communicate.

Finally, the seventh and potentially most important leadership challenge is to begin telling a different story. It is not enough to merely criticize the dominant myth. The challenge is to "write" an alternate myth, one that would better serve faculty and students. This is a monumental endeavour. I propose O. Henry's *The Gift of the Magi* as a possible preface for this new story. The ethos of gift that permeates this story provides a rich alternative to the mercantile logic of instrumental reason. The version I will summarize here appears in Estes' (1993) *The Gift of Story*.

This is the story of a poor young couple who, after a long-drawn-out war, had lost most of their possessions. As the holiday season approached both were hard-pressed to find a gift for the other. The young man's only possession was a magnificent pocket watch he inherited from his grandfather. As for the young woman, her only object of value was her long beautiful hair. Knowing that her husband cherished his pocket watch, and having no

money, she decided to sell her hair to a wig-maker. With the money she bought a chain for her husband's watch. She was filled with joy at the thought of giving her husband such a special gift. She knew that it would be the perfect gift. Meanwhile, her husband also found what he thought would be the perfect gift. He came across a street vendor who sold beautiful combs.

When the husband returned home he was dumbfounded to see that his wife had cut her hair. Not knowing whether to cry or laugh, he handed her the combs. At first his wife radiated with joy, but she quickly burst into tears. Her excitement came back when she remembered the gift she had for him. She proudly gave him the chain for his cherished pocket watch. Both began to cry, however, when he told her that he had sold his watch for the combs. Together they cried and laughed, realizing what had transpired.

This is a truly remarkable story about the meaning of value beyond use. The gifts have value, not because they can be used toward a clearly defined goal, but because they symbolically express something profoundly meaningful about each other and their relationship. Like the story-quilt discussed above, the gifts connect the giver and receiver to their history (the pocket watch was inherited from the grandfather). Paradoxically, the gifts exchanged by the young couple gained immeasurable value precisely at the moment they became useless.

In the example of David Hilfiker's work with the homeless it is the "logic of the gift" that allows us to say that he is not wasting his time and education. Whereas a means-to-end instrumental logic concludes his work is a failure because of its abysmal success rate, the logic of the gift concludes that his work is successful because it allows Hilfiker to live with integrity and to honour the integrity of his patients. In his book *The World of the Gift* Godbout (1998) argues that the gift of life, or "smaller" gifts like blood donations and volunteer work, are immeasurably valuable even if they do not follow an instrumental logic. The disinterested free gift to strangers creates social ties based on trust, solidarity, and care. As in *The Gifts of the Magi*, bonding-value is more important than use-value. It is the bonding-value of a true gift "that proves to us that we are not objects" (p. 174).

In the mercantile model reciprocation and return are measured by results. It is precisely the expectation of return that motivates an action. In the world of gift the return is immaterial and immeasurable—closer interpersonal ties, the sense of being true to one's values, or the transformation undergone. According to Godbout, the gift is not an object but a social connection that may constitute the basis of our living together as a society.

In the section on storytelling I gave an example illustrating how authentic storytelling can build commu-

nity. In this example it was precisely the gift of story, rather than the story-technique, that gave the experience its depth and meaning. The story-quilt was not the first step toward some predetermined goal, but rather a way of being fully present to the moment. (Godbout notes that "present" also means gift.)

William Lawlor carried this gift with him in the creation of a new department and in his mandate as chair of that department. I became a member of that department and saw him tell many more stories and organize countless other festivities. I recall one occasion where he organized a small celebration for three Middle Eastern students who had recently passed their comprehensive exams. Spouses and children were invited. The celebration was spontaneous. It was not part of any formal procedure. It cost very little and didn't try to sell anything. It was a small gift in honour of three students who had worked hard to overcome linguistic, cultural, and religious barriers. The students were beaming with joy and I was given another reason to be proud of my department.

Dr. Lawlor's department meetings usually began with a story, a poem, or music. He took it upon himself to "decorate" the fourth floor. The dark and somber corridors came alive with paintings, pictures, and poetry. He initiated a weekly "meeting" where a small group of faculty members would gather, sit in silence, and then engage in conversation on whatever topic was welling up from within. He believed, like Anne Morrow Lindbergh (1955) that to be more fully present to our work, and to each other, we need to find ways of becoming "the still axis within the revolving wheel of relationships, obligations and activities" (p. 51).

These activities and gestures were his answer to the instrumentalization of our work. He came to realize, like Borgmann and the growing number of architects Hale encounters in his work, that this instrumentalization is deeply wounding and disfiguring the university. As mayor of a truly festive city he was convinced that a sense of pride and community is not created, as Borgmann (1992) would say "in a hyperactive elevation of the daily but in festive celebration" (p. 134). He knew how to efficiently manage the business (the department was always in the black and his meetings rarely lasted more than one hour). He believed, however, that the "galloping hegemony of instrumental reason" would literally run us over unless our life in the department became joyful, celebrational, and infused with the spirit of gift.[4]

Notes

1   Although some of the authors cited in the paper write with nostalgia I am not claiming that we need to return to a par-

adise lost. As Fisher (2000) suggests, the past was far from idyllic. Besides, I have not been working in the university long enough to know what the past looked like. I am arguing, however, that the university, regardless of whether or not the situation is better or worse than what it was before, is in crisis and that this crisis raises critical leadership challenges. In the final section I do write with nostalgia given that I am describing an exceptional leader who recently retired and given that I am referring to the imminent disappearance of a department that managed to forge a sense of community through his leadership.

2   Since sharing the first draft of this paper with colleagues and graduate students I am struck by how deeply they identified with my description of the malaise and its origin. And although I do not have empirical evidence to support my claim for the pervasiveness of the malaise, the literature cited in this paper is part of a growing body of literature responding to some aspect of the problems arising from the malaise. Titles of recent books on the university are very telling: *The University in Ruins* (Readings, 1996); *The Moral Collapse of the University* (Wilshire, 1990); *Le Naufrage de l'Université* (Freitag, 1998); *Universities for Sale* (Tudiver, 1999); *Killing the Spirit: Higher Education in America* (Smith, 1990). Moreover the bulletin of the Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT) regularly carries articles discussing related issues (e.g. CAUT, 1999; Fisher, 2000).

3   It is important to emphasize that I am not arguing against computers in education. Rather I am arguing for a form of ethical leadership that is at the heart of democratic educational institutions, that is, creating opportunities for continued discussion and debate on controversial issues. Presently, educational leaders, including university leaders, are promoting the use of information and communication technology as if its merits were universally accepted and as if its use offered only advantages.

4   This story has an unhappy ending. Dr. Lawlor has recently retired and the department will, in all likelihood, disappear in the very near future. Those members of the department whose life was graced by Dr. Lawlor's leadership, and who feel nostalgia for what could have been, will hopefully find solace in the following words by Hannah Arendt (1958).

> The life span of man running toward death would inevitably carry everything to ruin and destruction if it were not for the faculty of interrupting it and beginning something new, a faculty which is inherent in action like an ever-present reminder that men, though they must die, are not born in order to die, but in order to begin.... The miracle that saves the world, the realm of human affairs, from its normal "natural" ruin is ultimately the fact of natality.... Only the full experience of this capacity can bestow on human affairs faith and hope." (p. 222)

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